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FREDERICK K. COX INTERNATIONAL LAW CENTER LECTURE*

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR STATE CRIMES: THE PAST TWENTY YEARS AND
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS

Aryeh Neiert

When Saddam Hussein was captured by US forces last December in a
hole in the ground in Iraq, he joined a select group of former leaders of
countries who will face justice, or who have already faced justice, for their
crimes against humanity. Others in that group include most of the officials
of the Rwandan government who were principally responsible for the 1994
genocide, including the Prime Minister at the time, Jean Kambanda, who
has been convicted of the ultimate crime and is serving a life sentence.
This group also includes individuals who had the main responsibility for the
great crimes committed in ex-Yugoslavia during the 1990s, including the
former President of the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan
Milosevic; a former Prime Minister of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic; a former
President of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic; and most likely at some
point, a fugitive from justice, Radovan Karadzic, another former President
of Republica Srpska - who will be apprehended because his arrest is
required in order that the international community can wind up and stop
paying for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;
and a former President of Argentina, Jorge Videla, who was convicted in
the 1980s, subsequently pardoned and was rearrested in 2002. Another
former head of state, Charles Taylor of Liberia, has been indicted by the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, but remains a fugitive from justice at this
time, protected - for now - by the government of Nigeria. The struggle to
bring former President Hissein Habre of Chad to justice in Senegal, where
he took refuge, did not succeed, but it has led to legal proceedings in Chad
against some of his top associates. Another former dictator, Augusto
Pinochet of Chile, was also spared the need to face justice because the
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courts of his country have held that the elderly general is no longer fit to
stand trial. Yet the case against Pinochet led to the prosecution and
punishment of a number of Chilean military officers responsible for
disappearances and other atrocious crimes. Also, a new court is getting
underway to try the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge who were
responsible for the Cambodian holocaust of the 1970s.
Plainly, there are many more heads of state and former heads of state
who deserve to be prosecuted and punished for crimes that inflicted great
suffering on their own citizens and the citizens of other countries. Yet what
has been accomplished up to now is not negligible. It is now the case, as
was never true previously, that leaders who are responsible for crimes
against humanity face a realistic possibility that they will be held to account
in a court of law, most likely an international court. It is still, of course, far
from certain that they will face justice. Nor are we yet near the point when
we can say it is a probability. But it is enough of a possibility that one
guesses that it crosses the minds of some of those who commit such crimes.
They can no longer be oblivious to the fact that others like them who once
exercised what seemed to be unlimited power, and who could act with what
appeared to be unrestrained cruelty, have been forced to defend themselves
against criminal charges. How did we get to this point? And where do we
go from here?
The contemporary struggle for accountability began just a little more
than twenty years ago. If a precise date can be fixed, it would be April 28,
1983, when the military junta that had ruled Argentina for the previous
seven years, on the eve of a transition to democratic government, issued
what it called a "Final Document on the Struggle Against Subversion and
Terrorism."
The purpose was to put to rest debate over the
"disappearances" that had been the method by which the armed forces had
prevailed over both their violent left wing antagonists and over their
peaceful critics in Argentine society: that is abductions by men in civilian
clothes, using unmarked vehicles, who took their victims to clandestine
detention centers, tortured them to reveal the names of others, secretly and
summarily executed them and then buried them in undisclosed locations or
dumped their remains out of airplanes at sea. At least nine thousand
persons disappeared in this manner in Argentina according to a government
commission that subsequently compiled information about the
disappearances and that said the number was probably a lot higher.
Estimates go as high as twenty to thirty thousand.
The "Final Document" did not serve its purpose. The debate did not
end. Indeed, the document had the opposite effect. In the short term, it led
to the election of a President in Argentina later in the year, Raul Alfonsin,
who called for the invalidation of an amnesty that the armed forces decreed
for themselves, Alfonsin established what became known as a "truth
commission" and also ordered the trial of the military's top commanders
including two men who served as Presidents of Argentina, Roberto Viola
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and Jorge Videla. In the longer term, the inadvertent consequence of the
"Final Document" was to focus the attention of the international human
rights movement, which was still in its infancy in 1983, on the question of
accountability for great crimes. In the two decades that have elapsed since
then, that question has risen to the top of the agenda for the international
human rights movement. It is the efforts of that movement that have
brought us to the point where a number of former heads of state, and
several hundreds of their top collaborators, have faced or now face criminal
prosecution and punishment for crimes against humanity.
In a number of ways, developments in Argentina put their stamp on the
way that the struggle for accountability evolved internationally during the
past two decades. One way was in the choice of terminology to describe
the forms of accountability.
Well before the issuance of the Final Document, one of the demands of
those concerned about the fate of the disappeared, particularly from a group
known as "The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo," had been for information
about their missing children. The armed forces put out a variety of
explanations for the disappearances, most notably that those who were
missing had left the country or had gone into hiding with a left wing
guerrilla group. However, the mothers rejected these explanations with
protests every Thursday afternoon in front of the presidential palace in
Buenos Aires and demanded the "truth." Truth was particularly meaningful
in Argentina because the methods by which disappearances were carried
out were chosen for purposes of deception. The military junta resorted to
deceit to maintain a pretense of legality, both domestically and
internationally. It did all it could to be able to deny culpability for its
crimes. Accordingly, when President Alfonsin established a National
Commission on the Disappeared, it quickly became known to Argentines as
the "truth commission." Thereafter, when such bodies were established in
other countries, the word truth was generally incorporated in their official
titles.
At the same moment that Alfonsin announced a commission on the
disappeared, he also ordered prosecutions. As the one effort was focused
on truth, Argentines said the other was concerned with justice. Ever since,
those struggling for accountability have tended to differentiate those
mechanisms that seek to reveal truth from those that are intended to do
justice.
For a time, the course of events in Argentina seemed to suggest that
while truth was feasible, justice was too difficult. That was because after
the top commanders of the Argentine armed forces, including the two
former presidents, were convicted and sentenced to prison, a series of
military revolts in protest against trials that threatened lower level officers who claimed that they were only following orders - led President Alfonsin
to call a halt to the justice process. His successor, President Carlos Saul
Menem, went further and pardoned those military men who had been
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convicted. As a consequence, in such countries as neighboring Chile,
which underwent a transition to democracy more than six years after
Argentina, no attempt was made to secure justice. The democratic
successors to President Augusto Pinochet established what they called a
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, but did not bring any
prosecutions. To do so, they feared, risked military rebellions such as those
that had shaken Argentina and might undermine their effort to build a
lasting democracy. The Chilean Commission was followed by a United
Nations sponsored truth commission for El Salvador that identified those on
both sides responsible for the ghastly crimes committed during twelve years
of civil war in that country. There too, no trials were held. The Salvadoran
courts were incapable of doing justice, the commission itself said. To make
certain, the Salvadoran government responded to the publication of the
truth commission's report by adopting an amnesty law - one of a series of
such laws in that country - prohibiting prosecutions.
About the time that El Salvador adopted its amnesty, a provision for
amnesty was also incorporated in the Temporary Constitution under which
a transition to democratic government took place in South Africa. Without
an amnesty, by then a popular device, a peaceful transition from apartheid
might not have been possible. But the government of President Nelson
Mandela that took office in 1994 found a more elegant way to deal with the
question of an amnesty than had been discovered previously. Under the
leadership of Mandela's Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, it took the
position that amnesty would be granted individually, not collectively. Only
those who acknowledged their crimes and fully disclosed them to a Truth
and Reconciliation Commission - named after the post-Pinochet
commission in Chile - would qualify for amnesty. Those who did not
acknowledge and fully disclose would remain subject to prosecution, and
could also be sued civilly for damages.
Though only a handful of South Africans have been prosecuted and
punished for the many great crimes of the apartheid era, the decision to
make amnesty only available individually to those who acknowledged and
disclosed their crimes made the South African truth commission the most
notable such body that was established anywhere in the world. It provided
those who had been responsible for crimes with a powerful incentive to
come forward and confess what they had done. By now, there have been
truth commissions in more than thirty countries that have undergone
transitions from dictatorship and tyranny to democracy, most of them in
Africa and Latin America. Some of these commissions, such as those in
Guatemala and Peru, have performed very effectively. Others, such as the
one in Haiti, have been of no discernible value. But it is the South African
commission that usually comes to mind when such bodies are discussed
because it presented riveting images of former torturers and murderers
testifying in explicit detail about their crimes, and sometimes demonstrating
techniques, often with families of their victims looking on, in order to
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qualify for individually granted amnesties.
Getting them to abase
themselves by providing such testimony to avoid prosecution had a
psychological impact that may be as great - or, in some cases, even greater
- than the effect of having them go to prison for their crimes. To the extent
that there is a sense in South Africa that justice was done, it is more
attributable to the testimony that was obtained from those who
acknowledged and disclosed their crimes in exchange for amnesty than to
the handful of prosecutions and convictions of those who remained eligible
for such punishment because they refused to confess.
The trend to rely mainly on the revelation of truth and to avoid efforts
to do justice out of fear that it would bring about reprisals, which lasted
close to a decade, came to an end with the work of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Established by the UN
Security Council in 1993, it was not taken seriously in its first two or three
years. Some of those who sought its establishment - I among them - were
human rights advocates seeking a means to hold accountable those
responsible for the genocidal slaughter in Croatia and Bosnia. Others,
however, were government officials who were glad to join in supporting the
Tribunal as an alternative to taking more robust measures to stop the
carnage. At least one of those in the latter category, the United States
Secretary of State during the final months of the first Bush Administration,
Lawrence Eagleburger, played a crucial role in launching the Tribunal by
putting the weight of the U.S. government behind it.
The circumstance was as follows. Three weeks after losing the
November 1992 election to Bill Clinton, President Bush announced his
decision to send American troops to deal with one of the two headline
international crises of the period, Somalia. That made it plain that nothing
would be done about the other, Yugoslavia, because a lame duck President
could hardly intervene militarily in two places. Eagleburger, as a former
U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia who knew the country well, spoke the
language and had done extensive business with the country when he was
out of government, apparently feared that he would be blamed for the
failure of the United States to deal with the disastrous situation there.
Accordingly, soon after Bush's announcement about Somalia, on December
16, 1992, Eagleburger, who never previously or subsequently manifested
any interest in the question of accountability for crimes against humanity,
announced his support for the establishment of a U.N. criminal tribunal for
Yugoslavia. He named ten persons - including Slobodan Milosevic - who

should be tried by it. As it happens, Eagleburger's timing was inopportune
as it took place on the eve of elections in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and helped tilt the results against a pro-Western candidate. But
the Secretary of State's statement insured the unanimous adoption of a UN
Security Council resolution two months later calling on the Secretary
General to draw up a plan for a tribunal.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia did not
amount to much during its first two or three years, both because of the way
the Security Council dealt with it and because it seemed to have no way to
obtain custody over defendants. The Security Council's attitude was
demonstrated by its failure to designate a Chief Prosecutor for fourteen
months after its unanimous adoption of a specific plan for the Tribunal
submitted by the Secretary General. As for defendants, for a long period it
had only one in custody. He was a low level Bosnian Serb camp guard who
had emigrated to Germany to avoid military service, was recognized on the
streets of Munich by former inmates of the camp and was arrested and
turned over to the Tribunal.
For a time, human rights advocates who fought to establish the
Tribunal feared that it would be abolished as part of a peace arrangement
before it accomplished anything. Indeed, this was suggested by some of the
government officials involved in peace negotiations. That prospect was
thwarted by the man finally chosen as the Tribunal's prosecutor, Richard
Goldstone of South Africa, by indicting Radovan Karadzic and General
Ratko Mladic in July 1995, about the time of the massacre at Srebrenica;
and by indicting them again for that massacre on the eve of the November
1995 Dayton peace talks. The indictments made it impossible for Karadzic
and Mladic to travel to Dayton for fear they would be seized for trial.
Without them present, the idea of abolishing the Tribunal was not pressed,
and it survived. But it still lacked custody of defendants.
That changed, however, when Tony Blair became Prime Minister of
Britain in 1997 and designated Robin Cook as his Foreign Secretary. Blair
and Cook began the practice of having British troops in Bosnia seize
indicted defendants - proving that it could be done, and that threats that
NATO forces patrolling the country would face reprisals for arrests were
empty. That made the Tribunal credible, getting us to the point we are at
today, where most of the defendants indicted are in custody awaiting trial,
or are on trial or, in a large number of cases, already convicted and serving
sentences and, in a few cases, acquitted after trial.
The ad hoc Yugoslavia tribunal inspired the creation of a similar
tribunal for Rwanda and, subsequently, variations in Sierra Leone, East
Timor and Cambodia that have both a United Nations and a domestic
component. And, of course, the ad hoc tribunals led to the establishment of
the permanent International Criminal Court, which is now in operation in
The Hague and will probably issue its first indictments later this year. Most
likely those indictments will concern crimes that are being committed, or
that have been recently committed by various militias, in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo ("DRC"). Another case under active consideration
involves Uganda. The government there has asked the ICC Prosecutor to
address the crimes committed by a bizarre rebel group, the Lord's
Resistance Army, which is notorious for its atrocities. An ICC prosecution
would probably be more effective than one brought in the national courts of
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Uganda because neighboring governments would feel a greater obligation
to turn over for trial leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army who operate
from their territory.
As you know, the ICC is only able to bring prosecutions for crimes
committed subsequent to its creation. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals in
various parts of the world, it does not have retroactive jurisdiction. Also, it
is limited to crimes committed on the territory of countries that have ratified
the treaty for its creation or by nationals of such governments. (An
exception could occur in a case referred to the ICC by the UN Security
Council, but as one permanent member of the Council, the United States, is
vehemently hostile to the ICC and could veto a referral, the chance that
such a referral will take place while the present administration holds office
is vanishingly remote.) Another limit on the ICC is what is called
"complementarity." That is, it may only exercise jurisdiction if the national
courts in the country where the crime was committed fail to do so, refuse to
do so or do so in a manner that is intended to cover up a crime.
These jurisdictional limits mean that there are only a handful of
situations in the world that could lead to an ICC prosecution. Many
situations in which grave crimes are committed are ineligible because the
governments involved have not ratified the treaty. It is not in the interest of
governments that practice gross abuses of human rights to become parties
to the ICC and, thereby, eligible for prosecution. Aside from the cases in
the DRC and Uganda now under active consideration, the situations in
countries that have ratified the treaty that seem most appropriate for a
prosecution are Afghanistan, where those indicted could be various
warlords; and Colombia, where left-wing guerrillas and right-wing
paramilitary groups are especially responsible for crimes that fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. It is noteworthy that in each of these situations, the
government is not the main agent committing crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court, clearly a factor in its readiness to ratify the treaty. The DRC
seems an appropriate first target, both because of the scale of the abuses
there and because of the utter incapacity of the government itself to bring
appropriate prosecutions.
Even though no prosecution has yet been brought, the ICC already
appears to have had a beneficial impact on the situation in the DRC. Until
2002, the country was a battleground for five other African states. Rwandan
forces had entered the country in pursuit of Hutu militias they considered
responsible for the 1994 genocide. The Rwandans were joined by Ugandan
forces. In turn, they were opposed by forces from Angola, Namibia and
Zimbabwe. All these armies sustained themselves and enriched their
governments - or leaders of their governments - by plundering the rich
natural resources of the Congo. Then, on April 11, 2002, the date when the
treaty for the International Criminal Court went into effect because it
obtained 60 ratifications (it actually reached sixty six that day, as ten
countries ratified simultaneously) the DRC was one of those that ratified.
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Whether a cause and effect relationship can be established is not certain,
but over the course of several weeks following ratification, each of the five
other African countries with troops in the DRC withdrew them. It appears
that, none of their leaders - President Kagame of Rwanda, President
Museveni of Uganda, President Dos Santos of Angola, President Nujoma of
Namibia or President Mugabe of Zimbabwe - relished the prospect of being
the first person to be indicted by the International Criminal Court. By July
1, 2002, the date from which the Court's jurisdiction began, all or almost all
their troops were out of the DRC.
Though the ICC may already have had a useful impact on the DRC, it
is important to recognize its limitations. It is generally believed that it will
be able to bring prosecutions involving no more than about three situations
at a time. There are formidable difficulties in dealing with even that small
number of situations. It requires getting to know the circumstances of each
of those conflicts very well and achieving the capacity to conduct complex
investigations involving a number of different languages in widely separate
parts of the world. To establish its own evenhandedness, the ICC will be
required to look at the conduct of those on all sides of conflicts, like those
in the DRC, Colombia and Afghanistan, that may involve a range of
combatant forces. It will be necessary to gather sufficient probative
evidence to bring successful prosecutions not only against those individuals
directly engaged in crimes but also against their superiors who may have
ultimate command responsibility for criminality. It would not do for the
ICC to replicate the early experience of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia by focusing on the low level camp guard over
whom it managed to obtain custody early on. Given the expectations that
have been aroused by the ICC, indictments will have to deal with those
much higher up. Yet, inevitably, gathering evidence of their culpability
sufficient to warrant a prosecution will be an arduous process. It cannot
simply be inferred from a pattern of abuses.
The nature of the effort that is required also ensures that only a
relatively small number of persons will be indicted by the ICC for the
crimes committed in each situation on which it will focus. It is hard to
envision that investigators for the ICC will obtain the information necessary
to prosecute more than about a score of persons in each situation. Just that
amount of information would require an enormous amount of evidence.
Then there is the matter that almost sank the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: obtaining custody of those it indicts.
Ultimately, the ICTY succeeded because NATO forces occupied Bosnia
and one of the governments that furnished troops to NATO, the United
Kingdom, led the way in apprehending those who were indicted.
Thereafter, the governments in ex-Yugoslavia, all of which depend on
international assistance, came under intense pressure from their donors to
turn over indicted persons they were harboring. Though some indicted
defendants have not yet been turned over to the ICTY, most notably
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Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, the handwriting is on the
wall, even for them. The circumstances in which the ICC will operate will
vary greatly. Wherever it focuses, it is essential that its efforts should
command sufficient respect to provide a strong incentive for the
governments that control the territory, and for other governments that can
exercise influence, to collaborate with the Court. This is the only way that it
may gain custody of defendants. Inevitably, however, regardless of the
ICC's own performance, lacking a military force of its own or an
international force on which it can rely, there will be many places where it
is likely to encounter difficulties. It is here that the hostility of the United
States could cause havoc for its operations for Washington has the most
clout - politically, economically and militarily - to get governments that
may be harboring defendants to yield them to the ICC. If it fails to do so, it
could leave the ICC with no means of moving beyond indictments to actual
trials and the possibility of convictions and punishment.
I do not mean to minimize the significance of even a handful of
prosecutions before the International Criminal Court. Moreover, as
happened when the Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia acted against Karadzic and
Mladic in 1995, even indictments that turn defendants into fugitives can
have a valuable impact. As noted, even prior to getting to the point where it
could issue indictments, the ICC appears to have had a beneficial impact on
developments in the DRC. Also, the Chief Prosecutor for the ICC, Luis
Moreno Ocampo, puts great emphasis on complementarity. He believes that
one of the primary - if not the primary - goals of his office should be to get
governments to fulfill their own responsibility to prosecute war criminals in
their own jurisdiction. Again, I believe the attention that has been given in
the last few years to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC - war
crimes committed pursuant to a policy or on a large scale, crimes against
humanity and genocide - has already had an impact worldwide that is likely
to diminish the number, frequency and severity of such crimes. It is already
difficult to imagine that a European government would again engage in a
policy of ethnic cleansing - and such manifestations of that policy as the
murder of the hospital patients at Vukovar, the prolonged and murderous
siege of Sarajevo and the massacre at Srebrenica - as took place in exYugoslavia in the 1990s. Similarly, it is hard to believe that an African
government would again commit a genocide such as the one in Rwanda just
ten years ago.
Of course, before those crimes were committed, hardly any of us
thought them possible. Yet they did take place, making clear to us the
extent that state barbarism was still possible during the last decade of the
twentieth century. The international community showed itself in a very bad
light by its unwillingness to intervene in a timely manner to stop those
crimes as they were taking place. But the human rights movement's
insistence that those principally responsible should face prosecution and
punishment means that we have at least diminished the chance that
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anything comparable will take place during the first decade of the twenty
first century.
It is also impossible to believe that the United States would again
allow its forces to commit war crimes such as those committed by
American soldiers in Vietnam just a generation ago. In Vietnam, American
troops established free fire zones in populated areas. We dropped napalm
on civilians. We bombed indiscriminately. We organized systematic
assassinations in what was called the Phoenix Program. An unknown
number of massacres of civilians were committed by our troops. Our
conduct in the recent wars in which we engaged - Kosovo, Afghanistan and
Iraq - can be criticized for shortcomings, such as the use of cluster bombs
or the fact that in the Kosovar case, we bombed exclusively from a high
altitude, thereby avoiding any casualties to American troops but increasing
civilian casualties on the ground due to mistakes. Yet we also demonstrated
a degree of care to avoid civilian casualties that was a great advance over
our conduct in that earlier conflict. We have changed, and the rest of the
world has changed. I believe those changes are largely attributable to the
wide-ranging discussion of crimes of war inspired by the international
human rights movement, its focus on accountability and its impact in
securing the establishment of the various UN sponsored ad hoc tribunals
and of the International Criminal Court. The U.S. government insists that
our soldiers may never be prosecuted by the ICC, but we have also altered
our conduct in ways that suggest that, if they were subject to the Court's
jurisdiction, there would be scant basis for bringing a prosecution against
them.
Though changes have taken place, if they are to be sustained, and if we
are to reach a point where those committing crimes against humanity face
not just a possibility of prosecution and punishment but a probability that
they will be held accountable, more is required. The challenge for the
international human rights movement in the next two decades is two-fold:
first to make the International Criminal Court effective; and, second, to see
that its work is supplemented by other bodies - including national courts
such as the one that will be convened in Iraq to try Saddam Hussein - that
can deal both effectively and fairly with a larger number of situations where
great crimes are committed, and a larger number of the perpetrators of such
crimes.
One important way to assist both the international tribunals and
national courts dealing with the same kind of crimes would be to establish
an effective funding mechanism. Up to now, the prosecutors and presiding
judges of these tribunals have had to devote a great deal of time and effort
to making sure that these bodies can pay their bills, preventing them from
devoting full attention to the issues they were appointed to address.
Depending on appropriations from a perennially underfunded United
Nations or on contributions raised ad hoc from friendly governments is not
satisfactory. Fortunately, a good model for a multilateral funding
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mechanism has been established in another field. It is the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. It receives applications for funding
from all over the world and has been able to respond to these with a
minimum of bureaucratic difficulty and, at the same time, has had a very
beneficial impact in improving the quality of the health services it supports.
A consensus is emerging that the Global Fund itself should be funded on
the following basis: one third from the United States; one third from the
European Union; and one third from the rest of the world including such
important donor governments as Norway and Switzerland, which are not
members of the European Union; Japan; and also from private donors. The
Global Fund projects that it will give out grants of $1.6 billion in 2004, and
$3.6 billion in 2005. These sums are a significant multiple of what would
be needed for a parallel Global Fund for Justice. For now, a Global Fund
for Justice would require only about 500 million dollars a year to meet the
needs of both international and national tribunals dealing with systematic
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Because of the hostility of the Bush Administration to the ICC, it is not
now possible to establish a Global Fund for Justice. I trust, however, that at
some point within the next twenty years, the Unites States will adopt a more
enlightened posture.
As to what else would make the ICC effective, what needs to be done
is fairly obvious. More governments must be persuaded to ratify the treaty
establishing the ICC. At this writing, the number stands at ninety-two, only
about half the governments of the world. Those that have not ratified
include a number of countries with the largest populations: China, India, the
United States, Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan and Bangladesh among them.
That means that most of the world's population is not protected by the
Court. Ratifications have come mainly from three regions: Europe, Latin
America and Africa. Only a small number of countries of Asia, the Middle
East or the former Soviet Union have ratified.
Here too, the posture of the United States plays a crucial role. To
persuade recalcitrant countries to ratify it is important that some
opprobrium should attach to the failure to do so. As long as the United
States maintains its present stand, it is impossible for that to happen. The
key is getting the United States to shift its position. Even if we don't
ourselves ratify, mitigating the rabid hostility of the current Administration
would have a beneficial effect. As for U.S. ratification, it is worth noting
that it took us twenty-six years to ratify the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and forty years to ratify the Genocide Convention.
Even then, we did so half-heartedly, incorporating reservations,
declarations and exceptions that undercut the effect of these treaties. My
hope is that ratifying the ICC won't take quite so long. The treaty
establishing it allows only full ratification. There is no option, in this case,
for half-hearted acceptance of the Court.
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The other crucial need is that the Court's own performance should
enhance its prestige. This would spur additional ratifications. At least as
important, it would increase the likelihood that governments would assist
the ICC in obtaining custody of defendants and, thereby, allowing trials to
take place.
There is, of course, a close connection between more ratifications and
trials. Wider ratification would allow the ICC to deal with a larger number
of situations where crimes within its jurisdiction are committed. And,
becoming universal, the ICC would gain enhanced capacity to get
governments to cooperate in its investigations and to turn over those it
indicts.
There are at least two ways to supplement the ICC. One would be for
the United Nations to continue the practice of creating ad hoc tribunals.
Another would be for regional bodies, such as the Organization of
American States, the European Union and the African Union to create their
own standing tribunals to cooperate with the ICC and to pursue in greater
depth crimes within their own territories. If this were done, it would be
useful if the ICC were to exercise appellate jurisdiction over cases tried in
ad hoc or standing international tribunals. A precedent for this is the
decision by the UN Security Council to have appeals from the Rwanda
Tribunal go to the appellate chamber that had previously been established
for the Yugoslavia tribunal. Creating a single appellate process is cost
saving, but even more importantly, it helps ensure the development of a
coherent body of international law to deal with international criminality.
As yet, the international human rights movement has not focused on
these issues. Up to now, getting the ICC off the ground and helping it to
become effective have consumed the energies of the international human
rights movement. But if one believes, as I do, that by itself it cannot fulfill
the expectations it has aroused, the human rights movement will soon be
required to think about subsequent steps. It took us two decades to get to
the point we have now reached, and I believe it will take us at least another
two decades of concerted effort to get to the point needed to ensure that
those who commit war crimes on a large scale, crimes against humanity and
genocide face the probability that they will be held accountable. Only then
will we be able to say that we are able to stop the commission of many of
the crimes that are the focus of the debate over accountability.

